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INTEREST RATE IMPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES:
A POSTSCRIPT ON THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
Abstract
An earlier paper by the author investigated the quantitative
implications, for the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies, of
a model treating the determination of long-term interest rates by explicitly
imposing the market clearing equilibrium condition that the quantity of
bonds issued by private borrowers equal the quantity purchased by lenders.
One incomplete aspect of that investigation, however, was the failure to
allow explicitly for the government budget constraint. This paper reports
results based on an expanded model that also imposes an analogous market
clearing condition in the U.S. government securities market.
The explicit imposition of the government budget constraint makes
a major difference for the simulated effectiveness of both fiscal and monetary
policies —indeed,a greater difference than that due simply to using the
supply—demand representation of the determination of the private bond rate
in the earlier paper. s is to be expected on the basis of familiar
economic theory, the effect of imposing the government budget constraint is
to make the real—sector effects of fiscal policy appear smaller and the real—
sector effects of monetary policy appear greater.
The main message of these results is that, when relative asset stock
effects are the heart of the issue as is the case in analyzing the
implications of the government budget constraint —modelsthat are implicitly
consistent with the relevant economic behavior are not the same as models
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An earlier paper by the author [8] investigated the quantitative
implications, for the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies, of
a model treating thedeterminationof long-term interest rates by explicitly
imposing the market clearing equilibrium condition that the quantity of
bonds issued by private borrowers equal the quantity purchased by lenders.
The objective of this structural representation of the corporate bond market
was to capture a richer set of financial—nonfinancial interactions, including
portfolio—theoretic constraints on the behavior of borrowers and lenders,
than are typically fow-id in the more conventional unrestricted reduced—
form equations estimated directly with the long-term interest rate as the
dependent variable. Apart from the treatment of the determination of long—
term interest rates, the model used to simulate the effectiveness of selected
policy actions was identical in all respects to the familiar MIT-Penn-SSRC
(henceforth MP5)model.The result of that exercise, in brief, was that
allowing for a richer set of financial—nonfinancial interactions in this
way made the real—sector effects of fiscal policy appear greater, and the
real—sector effects of monetary policy appear smaller, than analogous simula-
tions of the unaltered MPS model implied.
One incomplete aspect of that investigation, emphasized in the
papers concluding section (see pp. 350—351), was the failure of either
the unaltered MPS model or the combined MPSandcorporate bond market model
to allow explicitly for the government budget constraint. Although Ando [1]—2—
has pointed out that the MPS model does implicitly include the government
budget constraint (and Christ [31hasagreed with this proposition), even
ndo has acknowledged that the model excludes the financial market relation-
ships necessary to explore fully the relative asset stock effects emphasized
by Blinder and Solow [2) and numerous subsequent researchers. Moreover,
at the very least the absence of any explicit treatment of the government
budget constraint is inconsistent with the spirit of the earlier exercise,
the whole point of which was the value of representing financial—nonfinancial
interactions explicitly.
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of simulating the effects of one
fiscal policy action and one monetary policy action in three separate ver-
sions of the MPS model: the unaltered model and the model (denoted MPS-CB)
including the supply-demand representation of the determination of the
corporate bond rate, both just as in the earlier paper, plus a further
expanded model (denoted MpS-CGB) incorporating also an explicit supply-
demand representation of the determination of interest rates in four
separate maturity sub—markets of the U.S. government securities market
due to Roley [10]. Roley's government securities market model and the
expanded version of the MPS model incorporating it were developed primarily
for the purpose of analyzing debt management policy,1 and hence both include
substantial detail that is unnecessary for evaluating fiscal and monetary
policies. What matters here, however, is that the fully combined model
does explicitly impose the market clearing equilibrium condition that the
quantity of securities sold by the Treasury to finance the government's
deficit, less the quantity purchased by the Federal Ieserve System in the
course of providing the banking system with nonborrowed reserves and accoim-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results in Tables 1 and 2 show that the explicit imposition
of the government budget constraint makes a major difference for the simu-
lated effectiveness of both fiscal and monetary policies —indeed,a
greater difference than that due simply to using the supply-demand represen-
tation of the determination of the corporate bond rate in the earlier paper.
As is to be expected on the basis of familiar economic theory, the effect
of imposing the government budget constraint is to make the real-sector
effects of fiscal policy appear smaller and the real—sector effects of
monetary policy appear greater.
Table 1 shows the three sets of simulated effects of a $10 billion
per annum increase in real government purchases, sustained over ten quarters
beginning in 1974:IV and ending in 1977:1. As in the earlier paper, each
simulation relies on historical values of all exogenous variables other
than government purchases. Moreover, each equation in each model is
adjusted by adding back the corresponding historical single-equation resid-
uals so that, given historical values for all exogenous variables (including
government purchases), each model would exactly reproduce the historical
values for all endogenous variables. Hence the differences between the
historical and simulated values shown in the table are attributable entirely
to the three models' respective representations of the effects of the fiscal
stimulus, rather than to any underlying inability to reproduce the historical
record. The table provides comparisons of the simulated ten—quarter mean
values, as well as the simulated single—quarter values for 1975:IV (the
half—way mark), for each of a set of key financial and nonfinancial variables.
In comparison with either of the earlier models' results, explicitly
allowing for the government budget constraint more than halves the average—4—
stimulative effect on total real income due to the additional government
purchases. The mechanism underlying this change is easy enough to see from
the bottom three lines in the table. The enlarged government deficit in-
creases the total quantity of government securities outstanding, and the
slight reduction in nonborrowed reserves increases yet further the quantity
that private—sector investors must hold.3 Hence longterm interest rates
rise much more sharply than in the other two models.(By contrast, short—
term interest rates rise less because, with less stimulus to nominal income,
there is less pressure of additional money demand against the fixed historical
money supply.) The dividend-price yield also rises sharply, thereby depressing
equity prices. The higher long—term interest rates "crowd out" investment
in housing and, in comparison to the two other models, restrain the accel-
erator—induced increase in business fixed investment. The lower equity
values also crowd out a small amount of consumer spending. Overall, the
simulated ten—quarter average "multiplier" of government purchases on total
real income is only 0.6, rather than either 1.5 or 1.8 as in the two models
studied in the earlier paper.
Table 2 shows three analogous sets of simulated effects of a 2%
per annum increase in the growth rate of the money stock, sustained over
the same ten—quarter interval. Here the mechanism is reversed, with
corresponding but opposite effects. With government purchases heldfixed,4
the monetary policy stimulus to economic activity raises tax revenues and
hence sharply reduces the government deficit, and hence also reduces the
total quantity of government securities outstanding. Open market purchases
by the Federal Reserve, needed to increase nonborrowed reserves (and also
to accommodate a small increase in currency demand not shown in the table)
further reduce the quantity that private-sector investors must hold. Long——5—
term interest rates and the dividend-price yield therefore fall much further
than in the other two models, and equity prices rise further (although
short—term interest rates fall less, because of the increased demand for
money). The end result is a large stimulus to nearly all components of
real spending, especially homebuilding, that more than doubles the simulated
effects of faster money growth in comparison with either of the two earlier
models.
Although the results of explicitly imposing the government financing
constraint on the analysis of both fiscal and monetary policies are qualita-
tively consistent with the implications of standard economic theory, the
magnitudes involved are surprisingly large —inthe case of monetary policy
so much so as to strain credulity. Instead of the less—than—unit—elasticity
response of nominal income to money as in either of the two earlier models,
or even a unit—elasticity response as in a simple constant—velocity model,
the fully combined model indicates that a 2.0% per annum increase in the
growth rate of the money stock leads to a 4.1% per annum increase in the
growth rate of nominal income. Further, more than three—fourths of this
simulated stimulus to nominal income consists of an increase in the growth
rate of real income. To be sure, most of the familiar theoretical proposi-
tions about the relationship among money, income and prices presumably do
not refer to very short time intervals, but results of this magnitude are
startling for an interval of two-and—a-half years.
Although speculating abbut why a large-sáale empirical model delivers
a specific set of quantitative results is at best a highly tentative endeavor,
the simulated behavior of prices and interest rates shown in Table 2 suggests
a possible explanation for these extreme results. First, as is well known,
price behavior in the MPS model is very sluggish.5 Even the increase in—6—
the economy's real growth rate from 3.0% to 6.1% per annum, on average over
ten quarters, increases the average inflation rate from 6.7% to only 7.4%
per annum. Second, in the fully combined model long—term interest rates
fall surprisingly low in comparison to even this relatively modest inflation
rate. The average after-inflation (before tax) yield on seasoned high—grade
corporate bonds is barely positive at 7.62%, while that on long-term Treasury
bonds is substantially negative at 5.88%. The model's bond demand and supply
equations incorporate some portfolio responses to expected price inflation,
but expectations are represented autoregressively and the modeled responses are
incomplete.6 The compounding effect of the interaction between a sluggish
inflation response to economic growth and an incomplete portfolio response
to inflation represents a plausible explanation for the extreme properties
of the monetary policy simulation.
Apart from such specifics, however, the main message Of these results
is that explicitly allowing for the government budget constraint makes an
important difference in judging the effectiveness of both fiscal and monetary
policies. When relative asset stock effects are the heart of the issue,
as is the case in analyzing the implications of the government budget con-
straint, models that are implicitly consistent with the relevant economic
behavior are not the same as models that explicitly represent it.Footnotes
*Iam grateful to Orlin Grabbe, David Johnson and Richard Mattione for
research assistance and helpful discussions; to Vance Roley for useful
comments and for assistance in adapting his model of the government
securities market; and to the National Science Foundation (grant DAR 79-
10519) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for research support.
1. See Roley [11] and Friedman [9].
2. There is no need to repeat here the descriptions already available
elsewhere. The basic sources are Arido [1] for the MPS model, Friedman
[4, 6] for the corporate bond market model, and Roley [10, 11] for the
government securities model. See Friedman [8] for a description of the
MPS-CB model and Friedman [9] for a description of the MPS-CGB model.
3. The monetary policy assumption underlying these simulations is that
the Federal Reserve System holds the money stock (currency plus demand
deposits) to its historical path. The fall in nonborrowed reserves is
due mostly to a fall in net free reserves induced by the rise in short—
term interest rates.
4.In fact the fiscal policy assumption underlying these simulations is
that real government purchases are fixed, so that there is some rise
in nominal purchases as prices rise more than historically. The induced
price rise is small, however.
5. To recall, even in the MPS—CB and MPS—CGB models all aspects of economic
behavior other than the determination of interest rates are exactly as
in the unaltered MPS model.
6. See Friedman [5, 7] and Roley [10].References
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